Research on early compulsory schooling laws finds minimal effects on attendance, but fails to investigate heterogeneous effects. Similarly, research proposes limited contexts in which expansion policies can increase equality, but has difficulty separating policy and cohort effects. Capitalizing on within-country variation in timing of early compulsory laws, passed 1852-1918, I ask whether they improved equality of school attendance or educational attainment by class, nativity, and race. Based on census data, compulsory laws increased equality of attendance and attainment, particularly among young men in the North, where the laws reduced class and race gaps by over 20%. Early compulsory schooling laws provided "hidden gains," missed in previous analyses, suggesting policies that raise minimum schooling can increase educational equality in certain contexts.
Introduction
Politicians often note the importance of expanding education for economic growth and competition. At the same time, they suggest the government can drive that expansion. In (Meyer et al. 1977; 1979; 1992) . These authors suggest specific government policiesincluding compulsory education laws -play little role in educational expansion.
A competing argument emphasizes the role of the state in shaping and expanding the educational system (Archer 1979; Steffes 2012) . For example, Rubinson (1987) suggests the U.S. political system encouraged mass education and made the school system less stratified than in other countries. Walters (2000) stresses the importance of an implicit (Northern)
American school policy: meet growing demand by providing spaces and teachers for all. In each of these cases, the state plays an important if subtle role in educational expansion.
Compulsory schooling laws, which require school-age children to attend school for a certain amount of time, are a clear effort to expand schooling. Most existing discussions of (especially early) U.S. compulsory schooling laws suggest they had little effect on attendance (Landes and Solmon 1972; Edwards 1978; Goldin and Katz 2011; Tyack 1976; Lleras-Muney 2005; Katz 1976 ). Yet little research has examined early census data to test this claim and no existing studies investigate heterogeneous effects, which may explain previous null findings.
Meanwhile, reforms intended to equalize educational opportunity often show limited success. Whether examining trends in educational inequality or specific policies aimed at increasing equality of access to schooling, evidence suggests "persistent inequality" despite educational reform (Blossfeld and Shavit 1993) or different effects depending on context Torche 2005; Post 1994; Shavit and Westerbeek 1998) . Because there is no within-country variation in the timing of the policies, however, these analyses cannot separate cohort and policy effects.
To summarize, existing research suggests government attempts to expand education are largely ineffective; rather, educational expansion is driven by other factors. Early U.S.
compulsory schooling laws, which explicitly attempted to increase education levels, apparently yielded little impact on expansion. At the same time, existing research leaves a largely pessimistic view of the equalizing potential of educational reform, except in certain contexts.
Combining these two perspectives may yield different results. Research on the effects of early compulsory schooling laws -the first law in each state requiring children in a given age range to attend school for a minimum number of weeks each year -has not addressed the possibility of different effects by social background. Because the laws were geared primarily at lower class children, estimating only average treatment effects makes null effects more likely. Similarly, studies of equalization efforts have not examined early U.S. compulsory laws, which should increase equality of attendance and attainment. The laws aimed to increase attendance at the elementary level, where previous research suggests policies may hold the required attendance from ages 8 to 16, New Hampshire from 6 to 16, and Rhode Island and
Wisconsin from 7 to 15.
Compulsory laws aimed to achieve universal school attendance and were primarily directed at lower class and immigrant families who did not already send their children to school. For example, the Commissioner of Education (1891: 493) reports, "It must be borne in mind that the law applies to children of tender years, whose right it is to have schooling. If the misfortune or shiftlessness of parents has resulted in poverty, shall the burden of this fall upon young children?" Opposition to compulsory schooling reportedly came "from the lawless and criminal classes; from the idle and shiftless; from those who take no interest in the education of their children, or care nothing for them but to get work out of them; and, of course, from those who have felt the penalties of the law" (1891:520). A dissertation (Perrin 1896 ) and speech (Moore 1902 ) from the period portray 19 th century compulsory laws as aimed at lower class and immigrant children, whose parents do not appreciate the value of education. As the above examples illustrate, compulsory schooling laws aimed to override "neglectful" parents and increase attendance among lower class and immigrant youth.
While previous research suggests the laws had no effect on school attendance (Landes and Solmon 1972; Goldin and Katz 2011) , historical documents offer a mixed review: some state and city administrators saw no effect while others claim effective implementation. While the term "dead letter" is often used to describe compulsory laws, the New York City superintendent reported in 1890 that the law was enforced and effective (Commissioner of Education 1891:499). An Illinois administrator noted, "In the city of Chicago thousands of children have been brought into the schools through its agency. The same thing is also true in other towns and cities of the state" (Commissioner of Education 1891:505).
Historical debates indicate that compulsory laws carried enough weight for citizens to take them seriously. Discussing Connecticut's compulsory schooling law, the Commissioner of Education (1891:492) quotes a Connecticut School Report: "There are many parents who assert what they call their rights of governance. Such think it is unjust that they must send their children to school, and thus lose the profit of their labor." Objections to the law were outlined by the secretary of the state of Connecticut (Commissioner of Education 1891:493) as follows:
1) "Such a law would create a new crime." 2) "It interferes with the liberty of parents." 3) "It arrogates new power to the government." and 4) "It is un-American and unadapted to our free institutions." As these debates about compulsory laws illustrate, they were not insignificant at the time. Nevertheless, the historical claims are almost entirely devoid of statistical evidence and descriptions of the laws could merely reflect the rhetorical needs of the speaker at the time.
A Brief Review of Research on U.S. Compulsory Laws
Economic arguments suggest rapid educational expansion in the early 20 th century largely reflects individual decisions and high demand for educated workers, not policy changes such as compulsory laws (Goldin and Katz 2008) . Similarly, while research on later changes to compulsory laws find important effects (Lleras-Muney 2005; Oreopoulos 2006; Oreopoulos et al. 2006; Edwards 1978) , the few studies of late-19 th -and early-20 th -century compulsory schooling laws find that they had little influence on the expansion of school attendance (Landes and Solmon 1972; Goldin and Katz 2011) . Investigating the effect of later compulsory laws on secondary schooling from 1910 to 1939 , Goldin and Katz (2011 suggest that, at best, the laws accounted for six or seven percent of the increase. This study, however, does not study equalizing effects of early compulsory laws on elementary school attendance.
In the most relevant study, Landes and Solmon (1972) Landes and Solmon (1972) use first-differences to try to estimate the effect of a change in state compulsory law on a variety of school enrollment and attendance variables, they do not pool censuses. They only examine changes in enrollment between two censuses at a time (1870-1880 and 1880-1890) . State adoption of compulsory laws was fairly slow, so identification rests on a small sample and leaves their analysis with low power, increasing the likelihood of null results. Finally, their approach does not allow the use of state and year fixed effects to account for these differences. A better approach would be to pool censuses, estimating the effect of compulsory laws on enrollment rates with state and year fixed effects.
Furthermore, a recent study contradicts arguments that early compulsory laws were ineffective (Puerta 2009 ). Using a more precise county-level difference-in-difference approach, limited to counties along a state border separating those with and without a change in compulsory attendance law between censuses, Puerta (2009) finds that compulsory laws increased absolute attendance rates by about seven percent.
Regardless of their effect on absolute attendance, however, compulsory laws may have shifted the distribution of attendance or attainment by social background, increasing equality of opportunity. Such shifts in the distribution of attendance would be hidden in previous analyses that fail to investigate heterogeneity. For example, because compulsory laws were primarily aimed at lower class youth, a simple average treatment effect could miss equalizing effects by class. In addition, if the laws were passed as growth in attendance was slowing -in an effort to push the reluctant into school -research could find null or even negative effects. In this case, growth in attendance would appear to decline after the compulsory laws, even if the laws were effective in promoting attendance among the targeted, lower class youth.
With only one exception, no studies investigate potential heterogeneous effects by race, class, or nativity status. Puerta uniquely investigates heterogeneous effects by race, finding greater educational gains for black than white youth, but he does not study changes in equality by class or nativity status. Furthermore, the laws could have had different effects by gender, particularly if they influenced attendance through opportunity costs (Fishlow 1966) . Young men had more employment opportunities around the turn of the century and, therefore, higher opportunity costs, so they could show a stronger response to the compulsory laws.
I improve on all of the above limitations of existing research by pooling census data, capitalizing on state variation in the timing of the first compulsory law, and investigating heterogeneous effects by class, race, and nativity status, separately by gender.
A Brief Review of Research on Equalizing Policies
Research on educational equality has found little evidence to support claims -such as those by politicians -that policy changes can improve equality of educational opportunity.
Blossfeld and Shavit (1993) , for example, combine analyses of an impressive 13 countries over time spans covering a variety of educational changes, yet find an overarching pattern of "persistent inequality." These and many single-country studies (e.g., Park 2004; Pong 1993; Gerber and Hout 1995) , however, investigate trends in equality rather than attempting to identify the effects of a specific policy.
In contrast, Raftery and Hout (1993) and Torche (2005) study particular policy changes, finding maintained or even increased inequality, but limit analyses to one country. Without within-country variation in policy timing, these studies rely on changes across cohorts to identify policy effects. They cannot separate policy and cohort effects. That is, analyses relying on cohort change cannot rule out the possibility that apparent policy effects reflect unrelated cohort changes. Cohort analysis is common in educational stratification (Shavit and Blossfeld 1993; Shavit and Westerbeek 1998; Mare 1980 Mare , 1981 , but Post (1994) and Torche (2005) highlight its limited ability to identify causal effects.
Other studies offer more hope for educational reform. Whether relying on data from multiple countries (Breen 2010; Breen et al. 2009; Jonsson et al. 1996) or policy changes within a single country (Shavit and Westerbeek 1998) , there is some evidence of increasing equality in countries throughout Europe. Methodological differences (ordered logit as opposed to the Mare transition model [1980, 1981] ) could explain why their results differ from those of Blossfeld and Shavit (Breen et al. 2009 ). Alternatively, because the rising educational equality largely reflected increasing access to secondary school (Breen et al. 2009 ), it suggests government policy could improve educational equality through secondary expansion.
Consistent with this argument, expansion policies in Hong Kong increased equality of secondary school attendance (Post 1994) . Similar to other policy analyses Torche 2005) , however, Post (1994) cannot separate policy effects from unrelated changes over time because there was no within-country variation in timing.
A complicating argument suggests the equalizing potential of expansion policies depends on the context. Evidence suggests expansion can increase inequality at higher levels in contexts where education is free to expand Torche 2005) , but can decrease inequality at lower levels of education or in contexts where the education system is tightly controlled by the state (Post 1994; Shavit and Westerbeek 1998) . Post (1994) suggests expansion policies are less likely to generate equalizing effects in demand-driven systems such as the Northern U.S. Comparing compulsory effects in the U.S. North and South will provide more insight into contexts in which expansion policies can increase educational equality.
To summarize, while most research examines trends in inequality across cohorts with inconsistent results, a few studies examine specific policy effects. Single-country policy studies, however, face a key methodological limitation: there is no within-country variation in the timing of the policy, so they cannot separate cohort and policy effects. Capitalizing on within-country variation in the timing of early U.S. compulsory attendance laws, I examine the effects of this expansion effort on educational equality, net of cohort and state differences.
While Post (1994) and others (Goldin and Katz 2008; Baker 1999; Trow 1961; Clark 1961) suggest that (at least Northern) U.S. educational expansion is largely demand-driven and unrelated to state policy, others emphasize the role of the state in shaping and expanding the U.S. educational system (Steffes 2012; Rubinson 1987; Walters 2000) . Did early U.S.
compulsory schooling laws contribute to expansion and equality of elementary school attendance or attainment? Combining two largely distinct areas of inquiry -on compulsory laws and policy-driven educational equality -I ask whether early compulsory schooling laws increased equality of school attendance and attainment by social background in the U.S.
Why Compulsory Laws Might Equalize Attendance by Class: Theory and Hypotheses
Theory suggests compulsory laws could have been an effective equalizing policy. As Fishlow (1966: 427) suggests, compulsory laws should offset opportunity costs, which fall unequally by class. Lower class families with fewer resources are less able to forego the wages their children could earn in the labor market. By increasing the costs of non-attendance (e.g., through fines or social stigma), compulsory schooling should make attendance more likely among lower class youth and increase equality. If this argument is correct, effects should be stronger for boys, who have higher earning potential and opportunity costs than girls.
Relative risk aversion (RRA) theory offers an alternative explanation for a link between compulsory laws and equality of attendance. People invest in more schooling to prevent downward mobility. As more families send their children to school, it raises the incentive of other families to send their children as well, so they can attain a lifestyle similar to their parents.
While lower class and foreign families may have avoided schooling their children before the laws, afterwards they would risk disadvantage if their children did not attend. Stronger equalizing effects for boys could also be consistent with RRA, if families feel that a lack of schooling is more jeopardizing for men than women. Either of these explanations could generate an equalizing effect of compulsory laws; I do not attempt to distinguish between them.
As Hout et al. (1993:48) note, the size of the educational system must expand in order for opportunity to increase. There is disagreement, however, about how control of expansion is related to the equalizing potential of a policy. Post (1994) Based on the points above, hypotheses include:
1) compulsory schooling laws should increase equality of school attendance by social background (class, nativity, and race) in the late 1800s and early 1900s;
2) compulsory schooling laws should increase equality of educational attainment;
3) the laws should show a more robust effect on young men, who had greater opportunity costs of school attendance or higher risk of downward mobility from non-attendance than young women; and 4) compulsory laws in non-Southern and early adopting states should show more robust equalizing effects, particularly by race, than in Southern states.
Data and Methods
Below I provide details about the analyses and data used to examine the equalizing effects of compulsory attendance laws by class, nativity, and race. The sample is limited to school-age youth ages 6 to 13 who were related to the head of household in 1850 to 1920 censuses. 3 Combining state of residence, year of state compulsory attendance law (Table S1) , and census year, a dummy variable for compulsory school assignment indicates whether an individual is required to attend school in a given census year.
School attendance is measured with an indicator for whether a child attended school within the last year. Ideally attendance would be measured with more detail because daily school attendance was well below the number of students enrolled or registered. For example, Lassonde (1996) notes about antebellum New Haven that only around 2/3 of those registered actually attended on a given day. However, the attendance indicator is not a bad measure explanations, I also present models that limit the sample to individuals 10 years on each side of the compulsory cutoff (ages 4 to 23 at the time of the law in most states, which required attendance until age 14) and control for age at the time of the law.
Educational Attainment Analysis I investigate effects on educational attainment using the 1940 census -the first census to include educational attainment. Data from older cohorts in this census partly address whether the laws had a similar effect on attendance and attainment. As Mare (1980 Mare ( , 1981 Specifically, I use ordered logit models, which estimate the likelihood of completing a particular level of education. Compared to the Mare model, ordered logit is more parsimonious and is not sensitive to collapsing adjacent educational levels (which improves estimates that span long periods of time, such as this one) (Breen et al. 2009 ). A limitation is that ordered logit models do not allow social background or compulsory assignment effects to vary by level of education. Nevertheless, they offer a sensitivity check of whether compulsory effects are similar for both levels and years of education. The ordered logit models use the same sample and measures as the OLS models, but the dependent variable measures the highest level of education each individual attained based on highest grade completed. Levels identify those who have completed: less than grade four; at least four years, but less than elementary school (grades 4-7), elementary school (grade 8), some secondary school (grades 9-11), secondary school (grade 12), and more than secondary school (grades 13 or above).
To capitalize on the adult measurement of educational attainment, I set up a regression discontinuity (RD) design by limiting the sample to cohorts 10 years on each side of the compulsory cutoff (ages 4 to 23 in most states, which required attendance until age 14) and controlling for the assignment measure (age at the time of the law). Holding the assignment measure constant, RD assumes that individuals within a narrow window on each side of the law are similar except for whether they were required to attend school. All analyses discussed above are shown separately by gender and run separately by region (North vs. South). Null effects in the South, however, could reflect the smaller number of Southern states. Therefore, I also investigate regional differences by comparing the effects of compulsory laws in all states versus the effects of laws in early-adopting states (28 nonSouthern states which made attendance compulsory before 1895).
Descriptive statistics for individual level census data are provided in Table S2 . The sample excludes those missing father's SEI score (10%) and state measures (1%). Census data cannot provide information about father's occupation among those who do not live with their father. Excluding these individuals could bias results if absence of father's information is related to compulsory assignment. For example, youth could have selectively moved out of their parents' home in anticipation of being required to attend school when the law passed.
Alternatively, fathers of children who were required to attend school could have been more likely to leave their family (e.g., anticipating greater financial support requirements).
At the same time, excluding those without father's information could simply limit generalizability to children who lived with their father. For example, perhaps those who do not live with their father are less likely to attend school regardless of state law. In that scenario, the effect of the law would be weaker among those not living with their father, but excluding them would not affect estimated effects among those studied here.
To investigate the extent of potential bias, Table S3 compares samples with and without father's information. On average, young men and women without father information tend to have smaller families, fewer siblings, and lower maximum household SEI scores. They tend to be older, are more likely to be non-white, and are less likely to be in school or live on a farm.
While nearly all are significant due to the large sample sizes, these differences are tiny and suggest minimal bias from excluding those with absent fathers. In addition, only 10% of cases are missing information about father's occupation (some of which could reflect unreported occupation rather than non-resident father), which limits the extent of any potential bias.
Further, I only examine attendance among children ages 6 to 13, which makes it unlikely that individuals have left their parents' home and reduces concern about selection out of the sample.
Most importantly, there is no difference in compulsory assignment between those with and without father's information, which suggests selective omission among those required to attend school is not a concern. Nevertheless, it is important to note that results could reflect bias due to selection and are only generalizable to children living with their father. Tables S2 and S4 show that attendance and attainment are indeed higher when school attendance was required. Regressions below attempt to isolate the effect of compulsory laws. State-level analyses are provided in the appendix. Table 1 shows results of attendance analyses by father's SEI, nativity, and race.
Results
[ Table 1 about here]
The interaction between compulsory school and father's occupational status is negative and significant (at p<0.1 or lower) for boys in all of the models, except when limited to the South.
Based on the coefficients in Table 1 , compulsory assignment reduced the association between father's SEI and likelihood of school attendance by 27% among boys in all states, 83% in early adopting states, and 25% in Northern states. The reduction does not reach significance among boys in Southern states, which suggests compulsory laws reduced the association between father's occupational status and individual attendance, but only among boys in the North. Thus, compulsory schooling made school attendance more equal by class background, but only outside the South. Among young women, this interaction is only significant when including all states. The interaction between compulsory school and nativity status never reaches significance for boys, suggesting the laws did not influence inequality by nativity. Among girls, this interaction also fails to reach significance except in the South (Model 8), where the negative interaction suggests compulsory laws increased inequality of attendance by nativity.
Finally, the interaction between compulsory assignment and race is significant and positive in every model, which suggests the laws significantly reduced the attendance gap by race. Depending on the states included, compulsory laws reduced the racial attendance gap by 19%-30% for boys and 25%-33% for girls. For both boys and girls, however, compulsory assignment appears to have increased racial equality more in the North than the South. In both cases, the interaction between compulsory assignment and race is larger among those in early compulsory states than those in Southern states. For boys, this interaction term is also larger in non-Southern than Southern states. The gender difference by class suggests the laws were less potent among young women (except non-white women). The stronger equalizing effects among young men are consistent with the argument that the laws reduced opportunity costs associated with school attendance.
With lower earning potential, young women's opportunity costs may have been less influenced by compulsory laws. Gender differences could also be consistent with relative risk aversion theory. If women's life outcomes depended less on relative schooling (and more on marriage, for example), families may still have avoided sending them to school despite compulsory laws. Table 1 , illustrates the weaker relationship between father's SEI and the likelihood of school attendance among young men required to attend.
Furthermore, the figure shows that compulsory assignment reduced attendance gaps by race.
To further illustrate the relationship to class, Figure 2 shows average state attendance by father's SEI category over the number of censuses from passage of the compulsory law. There is a noticeable decline in the attendance gap between status groups in the censuses immediately before and after the compulsory law. In addition, variation in attendance rates among the status groups decreases with the law. Despite some variability before the law, after the law the three status groups remain quite close together with steadily increasing attendance, although children from lower SEI backgrounds still have slightly lower attendance rates.
[ Figures 1 and 2 about here]
In Table 1 , the main effect of compulsory assignment is negative in most models, but generally only reaches significance in the South and is positive in the more precise models limited to those ten years on each side of the cutoff. 9 Consistent with previous research finding the laws did not increase overall attendance (Landes and Solmon 1972) , this could reflect the large increases in attendance before school became required, with the laws aimed at reluctant truants. As shown in Figure 2 , many high SEI and farm youth began attending before the law and enrollment growth declined or remained steady with the law for all except low SEI children. Thus, with state and cohort fixed effects, negative main compulsory estimates are not surprising, despite progress in attendance among lower class youth. By failing to examine heterogeneous effects of the laws, previous research missed effects among targeted youth.
Though not conclusive, North-South differences suggest compulsory effects may have been less effective in the South. In the largely agricultural economy, compulsory laws may have perversely increased opportunity costs for lower class youth if wages increased due to labor shortages. However, unmet demand for school places in the South (Walters 2000) could have prevented compulsory laws from increasing opportunity through competition for school access. Table S5 shows that the laws similarly increased equality by father's occupational category, with greater equalizing effects among boys and in early-adopting, Northern states.
To summarize, individual analyses suggest the laws reduced inequality in school attendance by class and race. Compulsory laws weakened the relationship between social background and school attendance, especially among young men in the North, where compulsory assignment reduced the class and race gaps by 25% and 30%, respectively. State level regression analyses, shown in the appendix, echo these equalizing effects.
School attendance was increasing throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s. point out, as a given transition becomes nearly universal, inequality approaches zero. Importantly, however, attendance was not universal until about two censuses after the law (see Figure 2 ) and was generally around 70% (80% among high SEI youth) at the time of the law. There was substantial room for improvement, so results are not simply due to school attendance becoming universal.
[ Table 2 and Figure 3 about here]
Educational attainment results (Table 2 ) suggest similar equalizing effects. Among both men and women in OLS and ordered logit models, attainment is substantially and significantly lower among non-whites. Net of state and cohort differences, individuals required to attend school completed slightly (but not always significantly) more years of school.
Most importantly, however, compulsory assignment yielded a significantly greater boost in attainment for non-whites than whites. Figure 3 illustrates the interaction between compulsory school and race among women (Model 1 in Table 2 ). Among women who were never required to attend school as children, whites completed 3.4 more grades in school than non-whites on average. Among women required to attend school, however, this gap decreases by 22% to 2.7
grades. This equalizing effect of compulsory assignment holds in OLS models predicting grades completed and in ordered logit models predicting the conditional likelihood of completing education levels. The interaction terms remain at least marginally significant in all models, with only two exceptions. In both OLS and ordered logit models, women in early states and men in Southern states did not experience significant gains in racial equality.
Coupled with smaller interaction effects in Southern states for men and women, this null effect for men in the South is consistent with hypothesis 4 and suggests compulsory laws were less able to equalize educational attainment in the South than the North. Consistent with hypothesis 3, the null effect among women in early adopting states suggests the laws had a less robust effect on women, who had lower opportunity costs of education.
While class and nativity cannot be investigated, the positive interaction effects by race suggest compulsory schooling laws made educational attainment more equal by social background. Depending on gender and states included, compulsory assignment reduced the racial attainment gap by at least 6% outside the South (and as much as 53% among men in early adopting states). Thus, echoing attendance results, attainment results also suggest that compulsory laws increased educational equality, particularly among men outside the South.
Conclusion
Evidence suggests that early compulsory laws had different effects by class, nativity, and race, increasing educational equality. While previous studies find little evidence of absolute effects (Landes and Solmon 1972) , I investigate heterogeneous effects by social background and find evidence of hidden gains. Supporting hypothesis 1, results show compulsory laws increased equality of school attendance by class and race (and by nativity status at the state level). Consistent with hypothesis 2, compulsory assignment increased equality of educational attainment by race. In both cases, supporting hypothesis 3, these equalizing effects were more robust among young men, suggesting the laws may have influenced attendance equality through opportunity costs or relative risk aversion.
Existing educational research offers a primarily pessimistic view of educational reform (Blossfeld and Shavit 1993; Rosenberg 1991; Raftery and Hout 1993; Torche 2005) or suggests expansion policies only decrease inequality in contexts where the education system is not demand-driven but tightly state-controlled (Post 1994) . These studies, however, are limited in their ability to separate cohort and policy effects. Capitalizing on within-country variation in timing and net of cohort and state differences, I find the equalizing effects of early U.S.
compulsory laws were more robust in the North than the South, consistent with hypothesis 4.
Contrary to Post (1994) , my findings suggest that compulsory laws were more effective at increasing equality in the largely demand-driven system of the Northern U.S. (Walters 2000) .
My results could differ from Post's (1994) contention that expansion policies are more effective in tightly controlled systems for several reasons: methods (within-country variation, controlling for state and cohort differences); setting (Hong Kong vs. the U.S.); the discriminatory system of inequality in the post-Civil War South; or dimensions of inequality examined. Post investigates class inequality, not race or nativity. While I cannot tease out which of these explain the difference, my results appear to complicate existing arguments and suggest that expansion policies can yield different effects by both context and dimension of inequality. This complex three-way interaction could help explain previous evidence of persistent inequality and the apparent ineffectiveness of policy efforts. Further research should test this potential three-way relationship and tease out contexts and dimensions of inequality along which policy efforts can best increase educational equality.
Robust evidence of greater equality in attendance and attainment could of course mask persistence of inequality at important transition points, such as entry to secondary school (Mare 1981) . Growth in the size of the system, for example, could encourage elites to maintain their relative advantage by attaining higher credentials (Collins 1971; Raftery and Hout 1993) .
However, results from ordered logit models (Table 2 , Panel B) suggest compulsory assignment increased equality in level of educational attainment, which reduces concern about this type of inflation. Furthermore, in the late 1800s, simply attending school was an important transition.
While this analysis cannot determine whether compulsory laws influenced equality at higher transition points, it supports existing research (Shavit and Westerbeek 1998) with evidence that the laws increased opportunity at lower levels of education, including school attendance.
While Raftery and Hout (1993) point out that equality is expected as a level of education approaches saturation, attendance was hardly universal at around 70% (80% for high SEI youth)
shortly before and after the laws.
Consistent with authors who emphasize the role of the state in shaping and expanding the U.S. educational system (Steffes 2012; Rubinson 1987; Walters 2000) , I find that early U.S.
compulsory schooling laws contributed to expansion and equality of elementary school attendance and attainment. Results provide consistent evidence of "hidden gains," which were missed in previous research that only estimated average treatment effects of the laws. These hidden gains suggest reforms which raise the minimum level of schooling can increase equality at that level, at least in a developing context where schools expand to meet growing demand.
In (1985) . Classes. London: Verso. Source: 1850-1920 IPUMS Census data. Sample includes 6-13 year old children related to head of household. All models include controls for age up to a quartic, rural residence, group quarters residence, and time-varying state measures found related to the timing of early state laws: % manufacturing employment, % white illiteracy, % adjacent states with the law, % elderly, % foreign, years in union, manufacturing production per employee, and time varying % adjacent states and % elderly. Indicators for each state and cohort (in 5-year intervals) are included. Early states made attendance compulsory before 1895. Models labeled 10-year are limited to 10 birth cohorts on each side of the compulsory cutoff and include controls for age at time of compulsory law and its interaction with compulsory assignment. Results are similar by father's occupational category, shown in appendix Table S5. Table 1 ; 10-year-old boy in New York (non-compulsory) or New Hampshire (compulsory).
Tables and Figures
The association between father's SEI score and likelihood of school attendance is significantly weaker (p<.05) for boys required to attend school. Non-white boys have a stronger association between father's SEI and attendance, but compulsory assignment increases the likelihood of attendance more strongly for non-white than white boys (p<0.1). Compulsory assignment increases equality by class and race, but not nativity status in this model. Three-way interactions between compulsory assignment, father's SEI,and foreign or non-white are not significant. Table 2 , Panel A for women in all states. There are significant educational attainment differences between white and non-white women, whether or not they were required to attend school. Furthermore, educational attainment is higher among both white and nonwhite women who were required to attend school. The racial attainment gap, however, is significantly lower among those required to attend school, suggesting that compulsory laws reduced inequality in educational attainment by race. (2003) provide incarceration, male unemployment, and governor partisanship data.
10
Attendance rates by class, nativity, and race are created from collapsed individual census attendance data (weighted to represent the population) to produce state attendance rates among school-age children by father's SEI score, father's occupation category, nativity, and race. For example, I construct average attendance rates among foreign and native boys in each state at each census year. I follow the same process by race and class category, to examine effects by class background, nativity, and race separately. Youth are divided into high (SEI>14), farm (SEI=14), and low (SEI<14) occupational status categories based on father's SEI score and into the five occupational categories for the analysis by EGP categories.
11
Using state measures from 1850 to 1920, average state attendance rates are first graphed by census from the law and social background to illustrate how attendance rates changed with the law (Figure 2 ). Next, regressions including state and year fixed effects help identify whether compulsory schooling effects differ by social background. Table S6 includes descriptive statistics for the state level analyses, excluding the state-year observations with missing data (11%).
State-Level Results
Tables S7A and S7B show state level regression results. As in individual analyses, the interaction terms suggest the laws significantly reduced differences in school attendance by social background -whether measured in terms of father's occupational status or category, individual nativity status, or race. When class is measured categorically, the effect of compulsory laws on children of lower non-manual workers is not significantly different from the main effect on upper non-manual children (the omitted category). However, the laws significantly increased attendance of manual and agricultural classes more than children of upper non-manual fathers, with the largest effect on children of non-skilled manual workers.
The laws significantly reduced attendance gaps by status, nativity, and race as well. Thus, as in the individual level analyses, attendance rates are more similar after the law than before.
Contrary to individual analyses, however, results are similar by gender.
According to Raftery and Hout (1993) , compulsory laws should only increase equality once attendance has reached saturation among upper class children. To address this possibility, I create a state-level measure of saturation -measured in each state at each census year, separately by gender -which indicates whether the state attendance rate among high SEI or upper non-manual boys or girls is at least 95%. Including this indicator as a control in statelevel models yields similar results. In addition, I investigate whether any equalizing effects of the compulsory laws depend on saturation by including a three-way interaction between compulsory law, saturation, and class, nativity, or race (and all two-way interactions). In only two cases was there a significant three-way interaction (the three-way interactions of foreign and non-skilled manual background with compulsory and upper non-manual saturation), both occurring only when predicting attendance of girls but not boys. In all other cases, equalizing effects of the laws were unrelated to saturation of either upper non-manual or high SEI children.
Thus, while the ability of compulsory laws to increase equality of attendance among girls in some cases depends on saturation among upper class girls, for the most part compulsory laws increased equality of attendance regardless of upper class saturation. Table S7A represents the naïve approach, estimating the average treatment effect with no interaction terms. As in past research (Landes and Solmon 1972) , this model suggests early compulsory laws had no effect on overall attendance rates for boys or girls.
Model 5 in
However, as shown in Models 1 through 4, this average treatment effect masks the equalizing effect of the laws -the "hidden gains" for lower class, foreign, and non-white children. occupational category, nativity, and race among both boys and girls. In the South, however, compulsory laws did not increase equality by nativity. In addition, the laws had a smaller equalizing effect by race in the South, reducing the attendance gap by 64% ( These results suggest that compulsory laws carried more robust equalizing potential in the North. The laws increased equality in both the North and the South, but along different dimensions. In the South, they promoted equality of attendance by class and race, but not nativity status. In the North, compulsory laws promoted equality along all dimensions, and in most cases more strongly than in the South. Thus, the same policy could increase equality more strongly in one context more than another (e.g., North vs. South) and along different dimensions across contexts. These results suggest the equalizing potential of an educational policy depends not just on context but also on the dimension of inequality examined. . Young men and women without father information tend to have smaller families, fewer siblings, and lower maximum household SEI scores. They tend to be older, non-white, and less likely to be in school or live on a farm. While nearly all are significant due to the large sample sizes, these differences are tiny and suggest minimal bias from excluding those with absent fathers. Importantly, there is no difference by compulsory assignment. 
